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Association, property, territory:  
what is at stake in immigration?
Abstract It is often claimed that states have territorial rights, and that these 
rights include the right to exclude people who seek admission to their territory. 
In this paper I will examine whether the most defensible account of territorial 
rights can provide support to the right to exclude. I will discuss three types of 
theories of territorial rights. The first account links the right of states to exclude 
to the prior right of individuals to freedom of association, which is said to include 
the right not to associate and to dissociate. The second is a Lockean theory that 
grounds the territorial rights of states, and hence their right to exclude, in the 
prior right of individuals to private property in the land that constitutes the 
territory of the state. I argue that these accounts have independently implausi-
ble implications, regardless of their implications for the immigration debate. The 
third account is a Kantian theory that bases the territorial jurisdiction of states 
on individuals’ duty to create, sustain and submit themselves to a shared system 
of law that is a necessary condition of guaranteeing their rights and of discharg-
ing their duties towards one another. I will argue that the Kantian account is 
superior to its current alternatives. However, I also suggest that it cannot ground 
a broad right to exclude.
Keywords: right to exclude, freedom of association, property, territorial rights
The ground and extent of the right of states, if any, to exclude unwanted po-
tential immigrants from their territory on discretionary grounds is one of 
the most hotly contested issues in contemporary normative political theo-
ry, as well as one that has immediate and urgent practical relevance. There 
are many millions of transnational migrants each year, and the likelihood 
of this number significantly diminishing in the foreseeable future is quite 
low. Current international legal practice holds that as a general rule, states 
have the right to exclude noncitizens who seek admission into their terri-
tory with the exception of refugees as defined by the Geneva Convention 
on Refugees (1951). The right to exclude is generally understood to be one 
among several aspects of the territorial rights of states, which also include, 
most importantly, the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a partic-
ular territory, and control over the natural resources to be found in that 
territory. However, there is disagreement in political theory both about the 
purported grounds of territorial rights, and their precise limits, including 
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whether or not they involve the right to exclude noncitizens.1 In this paper I 
will engage with some of the most prominent accounts of territorial rights. 
My goal is to see how plausible these accounts are as theories of territorial 
rights in general, and to explore what they imply regarding the existence and 
extent of the right to exclude.
Before presenting these theories, a number of clarifications and stipulations 
are in order. First, I only discuss such conceptions of territorial rights here 
that are, broadly speaking, individualistic in the sense that they do not de-
rive territorial rights from the claims or interests of groups qua groups ( i.e. 
as distinct from the claims and rights of their individual members). Hence, I 
exclude nationalist accounts of territory, including liberal nationalist ones.2 
The reason for this exclusion is that I am assuming, without providing ar-
guments here, that at the fundamental level, political morality is constituted 
by principles that have individualistic justification, i.e. they are justified in 
virtue of the manner in which they relate to the valid claims of individuals. 
Furthermore, the political institutions and practices of liberal democracies 
are in general justified on individualist grounds, and it is an issue of special 
interest whether their routinely asserted right to exclude potential immi-
grants is consistent with the principles to which they claim allegiance. Sec-
ond, I will frame the debate between those who think that states in general 
have a discretionary right not to admit noncitizens, on the one hand, and 
those who are skeptical of such a right, in terms of the existence or absence 
of a “right to exclude,” rather than in the more familiar terms of “open bor-
ders” versus “closed borders”. This choice of terminology is justified given 
that the main issue under discussion here does not concern the substan-
tive reasons that may exist that argue in favor of restrictive immigration 
controls or against them, i.e. the kinds of considerations that may be taken 
into account by decision-makers when they determine border policy. The 
issue, rather, is whether state officials have a moral right to allow these var-
ious considerations to determine border controls. To illustrate, some the-
orists argue that there is some particular good, such as the maintenance of 
a distinctive culture, or social trust and solidarity, the promotion of which 
depends on restricting immigration.3 In a similar vein, others might ar-
gue that some other goods, such as cultural diversity, are best promoted 
by permissive immigration policies. Regardless of their substantive mer-
its or lack thereof, however, these suggestions are silent on whether it is 
morally permissible to promote the particular goods or interests that they 
invoke through coercive border controls. It may be coherently suggested, 
1 For important discussions of territorial rights, see Simmons 2001; Stilz 2009; Nine 
2008; Miller 2012.
2 See e.g. Miller 2007; for criticism, see Stilz 2011.
3 See e.g. Walzer 1983; Miller 1997.
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for instance, that even though social trust is an important good, and that 
the promotion of this good depends on limiting immigration, states do not 
have the right to promote this good in this manner because that would vi-
olate the rights of others. Likewise, the fact that diversity is good does not 
entail that its pursuit makes border controls impermissible. If we assume 
that political morality incorporates at least some nonconsequentialist con-
straints, then we ought not to rule out the possibility that certain ways of 
promoting the good are impermissible. As Michael Blake writes, “From the 
fact that we have an interest in a particular set of policies, we cannot infer 
that we have a right to it—particularly if other people may have interests, 
or even rights, in the absence of those policies.” (Blake 2013) Therefore, 
the issue at stake here is not whether there are some good reasons for re-
stricting immigration, but whether or not states have a moral right to act 
on those reasons. (It is not usually in doubt that they have a legal right to 
do so, with the exception of the admission of refugees, which signatories of 
the Geneva Convention are legally required to do. The question is whether 
that legal right has any sound basis in political morality). Third, I will use 
the term ‘admission-seekers” for all categories of people that seek to en-
ter the territory of a state, to capture all possible grounds of claiming ad-
mission. I use this term instead of “immigrant” or “migrant” because many 
in the theoretical literature and especially outside the academic discourse 
have come to use “immigrant” in contrast with “refugee” as mutually exclu-
sive terms, to refer to people who seek admission not because their human 
rights have been violated, but for other, typically economic reasons. The 
term “admission-seeker” is intended to be neutral with respect to different 
types of admission claims.
I will engage with three types of theories of territorial rights. The first ac-
count links the right of states to exclude to the prior right of individuals to 
freedom of association, which is said to include the right not to associate 
and to dissociate. The second is a Lockean theory that grounds the territo-
rial rights of states, and hence their right to exclude, in the prior right of in-
dividuals to private property in the land that constitutes the territory of the 
state. I argue that these accounts have independently implausible implica-
tions, regardless of their implications for the immigration debate. Some of 
these are sufficient to exclude them from consideration. The third account 
is a Kantian theory that bases the territorial jurisdiction of states on individ-
uals’ duty to create, sustain and submit themselves to a shared system of law 
that is a necessary condition of guaranteeing their rights and of discharg-
ing their duties towards one another. I will argue that the Kantian account 
is superior to its current alternatives. However, I also suggest that it cannot 
ground a broad right to exclude.
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Association and the right to exclude
It has been prominently argued by Christopher Wellman that the right of 
states to exclude admission-seekers is grounded in their citizens’ individ-
ual right to freedom of association (Wellman 2008). The freedom to asso-
ciate with others that one wants to associate with is usually understood to 
be of paramount moral significance. It is rarely disputed that this freedom 
is a crucial aspect of personal autonomy, of being able to take charge of our 
lives and to give it a direction of our own determination. Living our lives in 
association with people whom we want to share it (provided that they have 
the same wish) is essential to being the authors of our lives. We need only to 
think of the examples of marriage, of friendship and of religious worship to 
appreciate the importance of the right to associate freely. By the same token, 
not having to share our lives with people we don’t want to share it with is 
an equally essential element of personal autonomy. Therefore, so the argu-
ment goes, the collective of citizens of a state has the right, derived from the 
rights of its individual members, to make collective decisions through their 
political institutions about whom they want to admit into the territory of 
their state and whom not (Wellman 2008: 109-114).
The argument from association, as I will call it, is a deontological argument 
insofar that it does not rest on the thought that restricting immigration is 
necessary to promote some good. In fact, Wellman states that personally, he 
is in favor of fairly open borders, and would presumably support them if the 
issue came up for vote (Wellman 2008: 116-117). His claim is simply that the 
community of citizens has the moral right to opt in favor of closed borders if 
the appropriate majority so decides. How should one evaluate the argument 
from association as an account of the right of states to exclude? I will make 
two types of arguments against this account. First, I will draw out some very 
implausible, indeed unpalatable implication of understanding the commu-
nity of citizens on the basis of associational freedom. Second, I will advance 
a more fundamental challenge that raises doubts regarding this manner of 
construing the right of association.
The first point that should be noted is that understanding political commu-
nity on the basis of associational freedom in the manner Wellman suggests 
has much more far-reaching implications than he seems to realize. He sug-
gests that the right of free association involves not simply the right not to as-
sociate (i.e. not to enter into associational relations with people whom one 
does not already share an association) but also the right to dissociate, i.e. to 
severe existing associational ties with persons with whom one shares certain 
associations. This seems certainly right as far as some associations are con-
cerned: people have the right to divorce their partners or end friendships es-
sentially on any ground that they personally see as sufficient, even if doing so 
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is a terrible choice under the circumstances. However, the issue is somewhat 
murkier in the case of associations that have a stated, specific goal or dominat-
ing ideal. Consider the case of religious communities or churches. Churches 
certainly have the right to establish their own official doctrine and system of 
behavioral norms, and also to exclude or not to admit anyone whose stated 
views and beliefs are inconsistent with the official views of that church, or 
whose behavior violate clearly established norms of the community. It is far 
less clear to me whether churches have the right to refuse to admit or to ex-
clude people who fully comply with those doctrines and norms. Consider the 
following example: does a church have the right to exclude or refuse to ad-
mit people on the basis of racial criteria even though the stated doctrine and 
goals of the church make no reference to race? I doubt that it does.4 I think 
this example is importantly different from a real life case, in which the issue 
was whether the Boy Scouts of America may refuse to admit gay members 
at a time when the organization’s code clearly prohibited gays from being 
members.5 This is so because in the hypothetical example race is wholly ir-
relevant to the church’s mission, while the Boy Scouts’ at the time of the legal 
challenge officially held that engaging in homosexual acts or even the desire 
to do so is contrary to the ideals of the group. However, let us grant, for the 
sake of argument, that in the case of typical associations, the right to exclude, 
i.e. to severe existing relational ties, is broad and nearly unlimited. The ob-
vious implication of understanding the political community of citizens as an 
instance of associational freedom is that the right to exclude is not limited to 
current noncitizens but extends to current citizens as well. By Wellman’s own 
lights, we would have to say that states have the right to strip current citizens 
of their citizenship on just about any grounds that an appropriately specified 
majority deems fit. This is surely an absurd consequence. No existing liberal 
democracy claims to have that discretionary right; typically, stripping citizens 
of their citizenship is restricted to cases of treason, desertion from the military 
during wartime, or when citizenship was fraudulently acquired in the first 
place (Herzog 2011)6. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 15 
(2)) prohibits the arbitrary revocation of nationality (i.e. citizenship), without 
specifying, however, what counts as arbitrary. The European Convention on 
4  Even though I believe it does have the right to incorporate racial criteria in its doc-
trines, and then, as despicable as such a practice may be, it will have the right to exclude 
people belonging to the specified racial group.
5  The case is discussed in Wellman 2008: 111. The United States Supreme Court decid-
ed in favour of the Boy Scouts’ right to exclude gays in Boy Scouts of America et al. vs. Dale, 
530 U.S., 640 (2000). Recently, the group have decided on its own to accept gay members.
6  Some countries don’t recognize dual citizenship and thus those of their citizens who 
acquire citizenship in another state lose their original citizenship. In others, permanent 
residence in another country or service in a foreign army may lead to loss of citizenship. 
These practices, however, may be seen as ones in which loss of citizenship is chosen 
voluntarily by the affected individuals.
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Nationality (1997) goes further by providing an exhaustive list of grounds for 
revocation.7If we tend to think, after reflection, that there is no discretionary 
right to revoke the citizenship status of current citizens, then that judgment 
should be taken as a strike against understanding political community as an 
instance of associational freedom. Both current international legal practice 
and common moral intuition suggests that states don’t have the right to re-
voke citizenship on arbitrary grounds. If that practice and that intuition tracks 
valid moral principles, then this suggests that there is no such right. But if so, 
and if the right to dissociate is part and parcel of the right to associate, then 
we have very good reason to doubt that the acquisition and loss of citizenship 
is to be understood on the basis of the freedom of association.
Another wildly implausible implication of linking the purported right to 
exclude to the right of free association can be seen if we consider the issue 
of reproductive freedom. It is nearly universally agreed that, barring special 
circumstances, people have the right to procreate and decide to have chil-
dren. Moreover, couples (or individuals) may exercise this right without the 
consent of their fellow citizens. However, the children that are born as a re-
sult of such decisions have the right to stay in the territory of the state and 
normally become members not only of their families but also of the political 
community. This is not dependent on the positive decision of the political 
community as a whole. If we approve of this practice, as most people believe 
we should, then those who ground the right to exclude on the freedom of as-
sociation face a dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma, they may claim that 
in the cases of exercises of reproductive freedom the rights of individuals to 
associate (in this case with their prospective children) defeats the right of 
the political community to exercise its right not to associate. But if the indi-
vidual right to associate can override the collective’s similar right, then the 
door is wide open for individuals to invite noncitizens to the territory of 
their state and offer them permanent residence as an instance of their asso-
ciational freedom. In other words, if the individual right of association can 
typically override the collective’s similar right, then the latter is not a very 
strong right and cannot justify current immigration practices. On the other 
horn of the dilemma, they may admit that admission to the political com-
munity is not governed by the principles of associational freedom. While the 
first horn of the dilemma only weakens the theory, the second horn is fatal.
To see why the problem of reproductive freedom is so thorny for the argu-
ment from association, we may notice that children do not, as a matter of 
general principle, become members of whatever associations their parents are 
the members of. Take the case of Christian churches, for instance. Sure, most 
religious parents raise their children to adopt the same religious beliefs. But 
7  For discussion, see De Groot – Vink, internet and Bauböck – Perchinig – Sievers: 2009.
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typically, children do not become members of their parents’ church simply 
in virtue of birth but through baptism or some similar practice. There is no 
analogy of baptism for children to become citizens—they acquire it in virtue 
of birth itself. This points to an important disanalogy with typical exercises 
of associational freedom. Needless to say, the same holds for the various oth-
er voluntary organizations to which parents belong; their kids don’t become 
members automatically by birth. To be sure, these practices are not determi-
native. The associational theorist may respond that it is not her theory but 
these practices that are in need of revision. However, these practices as they 
currently exist are much more in line with the way freedom of association 
is typically understood. In the standard view, the voluntary choice of the in-
dividual to become a member (rather than her parents’ decision) is a neces-
sary condition of acquiring membership. Therefore, it stands to reason that 
the same should hold for citizenship, were it a case of associational freedom.8
Now, the proponent of the argument from association may counter the above 
objections by suggesting that they can be neutered once we consider that the 
right to freedom of association is not absolute, and that it competes with oth-
er moral considerations. For instance, she may suggest that revocation of cit-
izenship on arbitrary grounds would be such a severe blow to the personal 
autonomy of current citizens, whose projects and relationships are typically 
attached to continued presence in the territory of the state of their current 
citizenship, that is incomparable to what is at stake in terms of autonomy for 
current noncitizen admission-seekers. So in the case of current citizens, indi-
vidual autonomy defeats freedom of association. This may also explain some 
of our contemporary practices, such as the easier naturalization of the spouses 
or other family members of current citizens. Perhaps the argument might be 
extended to reproductive freedom: individuals’ autonomy-based interest in 
being able to make reproductive choices on their own outweighs the impor-
tance of freedom of association. Less plausibly, it may be suggested that this 
interest also explains why newborns automatically become citizens as well. I 
am not sure whether this strategy is very promising, because it opens up the 
way for a potentially broad range of claims to override the collective right of 
freedom of association, which will then look less firm as a basis of the nearly 
blanket right to exclude that is the justificatory target. However, for the sake 
of discussion I would like to entertain the possibility that this rebuttal might 
succeed. I therefore put forward two separate considerations that suggest that 
associational freedom is an altogether misguided suggestion as the basis of the 
right to exclude and of membership in the political community, respectively. 
These considerations represent a more fundamental challenge than the pre-
vious ones insofar that they do not simply point out implausible implications.
8  For discussion of these and similar problems, see also Fine 2010.
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The first consideration is the following. What is at stake in granting or with-
holding admission from admission-seekers is not membership in the political 
community, but rather entry into and (extended) stay in the state’s territo-
ry. Those who are admitted to the territory need not be granted citizenship 
(Sandelind 2015: 498). However, the freedom of association is naturally un-
derstood in this context as applying to citizenship, not to residence. It is 
wildly implausible to construe residence in the same geographical territo-
ry as sharing an association in the relevant sense. To begin with, that would 
imply that it would be necessary to get the approval of current residents be-
fore one could move into a neighborhood in order to live there. That would 
be grossly objectionable, for obvious reasons. Equally obviously, access to 
physical space to reside and live and simply to move around is a vital good 
that everyone crucially depends on to have any kind of life; everyone must 
be able to occupy some space. Freedom of association cannot extend to the 
exclusive control of, and the right to deny access to, goods that are vital even 
for mere subsistence. (I will return to this claim below). Finally, if sharing the 
same territory counts as sharing an association in the relevant sense, then 
the whole of humanity may be seen as constituting one single association 
in virtue of sharing the surface of the Earth. But then, by associational logic 
humanity as a whole would have the collective right to exclude persons from 
the territory of the Earth, which is absurd. The proponent of the argument 
from association faces a fatal dilemma yet again. It is either the case that 
sharing residence in the same territory is not an instance of sharing an as-
sociation. In that case, the state’s right to exclude admission-seekers from its 
territory cannot be defended on associational grounds. Alternatively, sharing 
residence in a given territory is a form of association, but then the right to 
exclude is defeated by the claims of members to access to vital goods. Either 
way, the blanket right of states to exclude admission-seekers from its terri-
tory cannot be justified on associational grounds.
Now, the following rebuttal to the preceding argument may be considered. 
It is true that admission to and residence in territory is logically distinct 
from membership in the political community (i.e. citizenship), but they are 
normatively inseparable, at least in the longer term. Long-term residents 
are permanently subject to the authority of the state; their relation to it is, 
for normative purposes, not different from that of citizens. Therefore, they 
ought to be able to acquire citizenship at request after a certain period of 
time, as a matter of democratic right.9 Therefore, admittance to territory 
with the purpose of residence is tantamount to a conditional offer of cit-
izenship (See Sandelind 2015: 498 and Fine 2008: 344). Therefore, insofar 
9 This claim is admitted even by theorists who uphold the right to exclude. Walzer 
1983: 31-63.
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that membership in the political community is a matter of associational free-
dom, states do have the right to exclude admission-seekers from their terri-
tory because admission to territory morally commits them to admission to 
the political community. Let us call this the “bundling argument” (the term 
“bundling” is borrowed from Fine 2008: 344). Abstractly, the bundling argu-
ment states that if X has the right to refuse to give A to Y, and if giving B to 
Y would commit X to giving A to Y as well, then X has the right to refuse to 
give B, too, even though X does not have the right to refuse B per se, i.e. when 
considered independently of the commitments that giving B would create.
I am not sure if this is a generally valid form of argument. Suppose you have 
the right to refuse to let me into your house (even if letting me in would not 
impose more than modest costs on you). Suppose also that you have no right 
to refuse vital assistance to me if you can do so at little cost to yourself. Sup-
pose further that the only way you can give me vital assistance under the cir-
cumstances is to take me into your house and provide it there. Other things 
being equal (i.e. if the costs to you of having to admit me into your house are 
not excessive), it would seem to me that you cannot refuse to admit me into 
your house under the circumstances. Now, it might be argued that the “oth-
er things being equal” clause does not apply to the immigration case: it may 
be suggested that admitting people into the political community imposes 
much larger burden on current members than simply admitting people into 
the territory of their state. It is hard to believe that this could be so. Sharing 
public space sand the material and cultural environment looks like more im-
mediately consequential than sharing political membership. But one reason 
why it could be seen differently is suggested by Wellman. Members (citizens) 
have the right to participate in decisions regarding the formal political struc-
ture of the group itself, i.e. about its very collective self (see Wellman 2008: 
115). Therefore, I will entertain the thought that this rebuttal is successful. 
What the rebuttal shows if it succeeds is this. Even though states do not have 
an associational right to exclude admission-seekers from their territory, the 
right to exclude from territory is a necessary condition of exercising their 
right to associational freedom. Therefore, they have the right to that which 
is a necessary condition of the exercise of their right to associate because 
otherwise the latter would be vacuous.10 This rebuttal preserves as one of its 
premises the assumption that political membership is based on associational 
10 I think this argument runs into the obvious problem that in many cases, the admis-
sion-seekers’ admission to territory is also a necessary condition of the exercise of many 
of their fundamental rights. Therefore, in order to show that the current members’ right 
to exclude prevails it is not sufficient to show that that right is a necessary condition of 
the exercise of their associational rights. It also has to be shown that that right enjoys 
priority over the fundamental rights of admission-seekers. However, I will not pursue 
this argument here.
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freedom. Now, I will challenge this thought directly. Let me start by pointing 
out an obvious fact: political communities and states are not voluntary orga-
nizations. The overwhelming majority of members become citizens by birth 
rather than by choice, as is the case with voluntary associations falling under 
the scope of associational freedom. Moreover, it is not simply the manner of 
acquiring membership that marks a sharp contrast between states and vol-
untary associations. Voluntary associations have morally optional goals, i.e. 
such goals that their members do not typically have a prior and independent 
duty to pursue (or do not have a duty to pursue it in an associational form).11 
Voluntary associations are typically about the pursuit of projects and goals 
that persons are free to adopt and also not to adopt—religious worship, ar-
tistic, scholarly, professional or athletic advancement, and so on. They are, 
at a fundamental level, about what people do with their lives as far as their 
exercise of personal autonomy is concerned. As part of their personal auton-
omy, they may decide to pursue certain goals or activities or relationships 
in a collective, associational setting rather than on their own. By contrast, 
states are non-voluntary in a second, crucially important sense as well. Their 
goal, or point of existing, is constituted by morally required rather than op-
tional ends. States by hypothesis make rules that are binding for all those 
subject to them and can be enforced through the use or threat of force even 
against those who disagree with them. This right to rule and use force can 
be justified only because it is a necessary condition of their members’ and 
residents’ discharging such duties that they have towards each other prior 
to and independent of the existence of the state. They have a fundamental 
duty to live in peace and justice with each other, which is not possible with-
out submitting themselves to and sustaining a shared system of just laws.12 
If they cannot honor their duty to live in justice with each other without 
submitting themselves to the authority of the state, then they have a duty to 
submit themselves to it. This is not optional but morally required of them.
What is the import of this difference? I think it helps us clarifying the ground 
and limits of freedom of association. The moral significance of the freedom 
to associate is related to the moral significance of personal autonomy, i.e. of 
being able to pursue our self-chosen projects and relationships that we adopt 
in light of our own reasons. Even though we may think (as I do) that the val-
ues in light of which we decide which projects and relationships to pursue 
are objective, it is still the case that the reasons provided by these objective 
11 I added the qualification in within the brackets to acknowledge that some voluntary 
associations pursue goals that plausibly all of us have a humanitarian duty to contribute 
to (think of Amnesty International, for instance). But we do not have a duty to pursue it 
by becoming members of AI or donating to it, or in any way contributing to it.
12 I am assuming here a Kantian theory of the basis of political authority and obligation. 
For details, see e.g. Arthur Ripstein, Anna Stilz, Jeremy Waldron, etc.
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values alone underdetermine what projects we have most reason to adopt 
(see Raz 1986: 385-390). We are morally free to choose among the available 
projects, and we are also morally free to decide with whom, if anyone, we 
intend to pursue these projects. This is a crucial aspect of autonomy. But of 
course our personal autonomy extends only to the use of goods and resources 
that we rightfully possess. I cannot pursue my self-chosen projects by taking 
what is yours or, which amounts to the same thing, by excluding your access 
to that which you have a rightful claim to. The pursuit of personal autonomy 
is constrained by justice (which is not to deny that part of the point of justice 
may be to enable people to pursue their autonomous projects). It cannot be 
exercised in such a manner that results in the violation of the justice-based 
claims of others to access to vital goods. For that reason, insofar as access to 
territory is itself a vital good or a necessary condition of the exercise of fun-
damental rights grounded in justice, associational freedom does not include 
the right to exclude admission-seekers from a particular territory, provided 
that they depend on access to that territory in order to be able to exercise 
their fundamental rights.13
Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, the goals and function 
of political community (understood as an institutionally organized society 
exercising control over a particular territory) are crucially different from 
those of voluntary associations that fall within the purview of associational 
freedom. The latter are instances of collective exercises of personal auton-
omy in the pursuit of optional projects, while the former is the collective 
pursuit of a morally required project, the establishment of justice over a giv-
en territory, which is a necessary condition of the fair pursuit of autonomy 
for all. Therefore, the former is morally prior to and constrains the latter. 
Individuals’ right to pursue their autonomy,individually or in voluntary as-
sociation with others, is limited to the use of goods and resources that they 
rightfully possess. One of the chief goals of political community, by con-
trast, is exactly to make sure that each person possesses the goods that they 
have a rightful claim to. Second, and relatedly, people may not exercise their 
autonomy in such ways as to exclude others from what they have a right-
ful claim to. Therefore, whether admission-seekers may be excluded from 
the territory of the state they seek admission to depends not on the asso-
ciational freedom of current members and residents, but on whether their 
admission is necessary for them (the admission-seekers) to have their valid 
claims met, and whether their admission would threaten the valid claims 
of current residents to a fair share of resources, etc. An account of the fair 
13 To be sure, admission-seekers hold this claim not against particular states but against 
the international community of states. Therefore, their claim to territory is not a claim 
to be admitted to the territory of a particular state.
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shares that each – both admission-seekers and current residents – are enti-
tled to is both logically and normatively prior to a proper account of free-
dom of association. It is logically prior because we can specify what counts 
as a morally protected exercise of associational freedom only once we have 
determined who is entitled to what resources, and whether a particular ex-
ercise involves only those resources that the persons engaging in it rightful-
ly possess. And it is normatively prior just because only those exercises are 
morally protected that involve only such resources that are rightfully held 
by those engaging in them. In sum, the right to freedom of association can-
not ground the right to exclude.
Property and the right to exclude
Another influential, Lockean theory of the territorial rights of states claims 
that states’ right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a particular territory 
is derived from the prior right of ownership of their individual residents of 
the land that makes up that territory. The idea is that first, individuals gain 
ownership rights of pieces of land, and subsequently they decide to form a 
political community, in the process transferring (at least some aspects of) 
their ownership rights to the state.14 The state’s territorial rights are sim-
ply an aggregation of prior individual rights of property in land, deriving 
from delegation by each individual who had such property rights. And since 
property right over a particular territory is usually understood to include the 
right to control entry into that territory, there is a simple and straightfor-
ward inference from property rights through territorial rights to the right 
to exclude admission-seekers.
It seems to me that the problems with the proposal based on individual prop-
erty rights are glaringly obvious and should make this account a non-start-
er.15 First of all, it rests on a very controversial and implausible theory of 
political authority based on individual consent. It is widely recognized that 
consent cannot be the basis of the general authority of the state, since most 
people do not by an act of voluntary and deliberate consent submit them-
selves to the authority of the state. As for delegation of property rights to 
the state, this is even more implausible in the case of later generations who 
acquire property rights already under the circumstances of political rule. It 
is very hard to see which of their acts could be seen as a moral equivalent of 
delegating their property rights to the state. Secondly and independently, 
14 See Steiner, 1996. Cara Nine’s account in Nine 2008 represents another Lockean 
view, but one that does not rely on individual ownership. Therefore, the criticisms that 
follow do not apply to her view.
15 For a thorough criticism, see e.g. Stilz 2009. My objections listed below are adopt-
ed from her work.
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if the ultimate basis of the territorial rights of states is individual property 
rights in land, then it should be possible, morally speaking, for individuals 
to withdraw their delegation and secede from the state with their land. The 
fact that such a right is neither  recognized in legal practice nor claimed by 
many as plausible suggests that there is no such individual right to secede.16I 
take the fact that the Lockean property-based theory implies an individual 
right to secede as a reductio, and therefore will not further discuss this ac-
count.17 Instead, I turn to the third, Kantian account.
Occupancy and Territorial Rights
In this section I will outline what I take to be the most plausible basis of state’s 
territorial rights, and then turn to examine whether this account supports 
the robust right to exclude that is generally asserted both by national gov-
ernments and many theorists. This account relies on individuals’ dependence 
on secure access to and occupancy of some territory for their ability to pur-
sue their projects and relationships in an autonomous manner.18 Its starting 
point is the rather simple and straightforward observation that it is true of 
almost all people that being able to pursue their long-term projects and re-
lationships that occupy central roles in their life-plans – studies, careers, ro-
mantic relationships and friendships, family, etc. – require that they have se-
cure access to the particular places to which these projects and relationships 
are attached. By ‘secure’ access I mean that by and large, they can enter these 
places and stay within them at will, without having to depend on the discre-
tionary decision of some other party, be it a private actor or some official. 
It is important to notice that the pursuit of individual autonomy is depen-
dent on having secure access to particular places in a way that guaranteeing 
more basic rights such as subsistence, freedom from torture, inhuman pun-
ishment or persecution is not. In principle, it is possible for one’s most basic 
human rights to be safely protected while continuously being transported 
from one place to another, all the while being well-fed and well-housed, and 
safe from physical or psychological suffering. The same is not true (at least 
for the overwhelming majority of people) for the pursuit of more complex, 
medium- and long-term plans that involve the investment of effort, time, the 
development of skills, working on complex tasks, associating and building 
16 Of course, this is just an appeal to intuition rather than an argument. Steiner does 
in fact insist, heroically, that this seemingly implausible implication of the property-based 
theory is one that we should accept. See Steiner 2008.
17 There are other, similarly fatal objections to this view, such as its failure to distinguish 
between property rights, jurisdictional rights, and meta-jurisdictional rights, amply 
discussed in Stilz and Nine.
18 The account broadly follows Kantian theories of territorial rights, e.g. the works by 
Stilz referred to above and Ypi 2014.
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relationships with particular others, etc. These plans typically depend on 
being regularly present in the same locations. And since people have a very 
strong moral claim to the conditions of autonomy (the latter understood as 
the pursuit of projects chosen or endorsed in light of one’s own convictions 
about value), they have a very strong moral claim to securely access and stay 
in the locations where they have already ongoing projects.
I am assuming that the claim to access locations to which existing projects 
are linked is stronger than the claim to access locations where one wishes 
to engage in future projects not yet started, other things being equal.19 This 
is so for the following reason. The fact that one has already been engaged 
with a project, that she already invested significant effort, time, resources 
and thought to it, creates new and stronger reasons to go on with these proj-
ects than the reasons that there are to start these projects in the first place. 
There are many valuable projects that one may engage with, the objective 
value of which provides reasons to pursue them. However, given value plu-
ralism and a reasonable degree of incommensurability of values, these rea-
sons alone do not determine which projects one has most reason to pursue, 
or more reason than some others. By contrast, the fact of having chosen a 
particular project and of having pursued it to a non-trivial degree singles 
that project out as salient and provides one with special reasons to continue 
with them.20 (This is not to say that these special reasons cannot be defeated 
by other considerations. One may always come to see that chosen projects 
are not good fits for one’s personality, even as she continues to see them as 
objectively valuable). Therefore, other things being equal, there is more at 
stake for someone in being able tocontinue to pursue projects that one has 
developed a commitment to than for someone in being able to start a par-
ticular project that one has not yet invested significantly emotionally, intel-
lectually and otherwise.
If this is so, then people with existing projects tied to particular locations 
have (defeasible) priority in access to those locations over people with no 
existing projects tied to the locations, should it be the case that their claims 
to access conflict, other things being equal. And since current residents typ-
ically have more ongoing projects tied to a location than current non-resi-
dents, residents have some priority, other things being equal. However, oth-
er things are often not equal and it is now time to unpack the conditions 
under which the suggested priority holds. First, it should be noted that the 
priority claim just introduced grounds a (defeasible) right to exclude people 
from a location who lack existing projects tied to it only when their claims 
to access conflict with the claims to access of people with existing projects 
19 However, other things are usually not equal, as I discuss below.
20 See Raz 1986: 385-90.
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tied to the location. When their claims do not conflict, or when the formers’ 
access would merely make it slightly more onerous for the latters’ to pur-
sue their existing projects, then there is no such presumptive right. Second, 
the priority holds only if there are no other interests, more fundamental than 
autonomy, at stake for those without current projects tied to the location. If 
their basic human rights of subsistence and freedom from inhuman treat-
ment, etc. can be secured only if they can access those locations, then the au-
tonomy-based priority of people with current projects in the location can be 
defeated. Third, the priority holds only if those without current projects in 
the location have equivalent (or at least adequate) opportunities for similar 
projects in other locations, either at the place of their current residence or 
at other places such that their access to them does not conflict with the au-
tonomy-based claims of their current residents. If a particular project can be 
pursued in a single country, and it has no equivalents elsewhere either, then 
the priority of current residents strikes me as significantly weaker.
I will return to the issue of the relative strength of claims of different cate-
gories of people to access a particular location shortly. But how do we get 
from the claims of individuals to access particular locations to the territori-
al right of states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a particular territo-
ry? It is this transition that gives this account of territorial rights a distinctly 
Kantian flavor. The general idea is that individuals can enjoy their “exter-
nal” freedom of property and autonomy only under a shared system of laws, 
because without such, it is impossible to impartially and peacefully resolve 
disagreements regarding the precise boundaries of the rights of each. More-
over, since there is a conventional aspect to how the specific boundaries are 
drawn, i.e. morality alone underspecifies the content of these rights, there are 
several different but equivalent or at least acceptable ways of drawing them. 
However, a scheme of rights can operate only if a single system of legal rules 
are in place to specify the boundaries for all. This is why it is necessary not 
only that some system of rules is implemented in a territory, but that a single 
system is implemented exclusively. This is why states need exclusive juris-
diction over a particular territory, since exclusivity is a necessary condition 
of their being able to realize their overarching goal, the establishment of a 
system of rights and justice among persons. The right of states to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over a particular territory is thus grounded in the fact 
that this right is necessary to establish justice among persons in that territory. 
The general point can also be made without reference to the specifics of 
Kantian political theory. The basic idea is that the state – the maker and 
enforcer of binding rules – is a necessary condition of establishing justice 
among persons residing in a given territory. Among other things, one of the 
main functions of states is to resolve coordination problems among persons 
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– problems arising from the fact that many goals are such that there are mul-
tiple and roughly equivalent alternative ways of achieving them but they 
can be achieved only if all or at least most people adopt the same alternative 
course of action. Traffic is the textbook example: it is plausibly a shared goal 
of all drivers to be able to reach their destinations safely and without causing 
harm to or imposing undue risk on others. They can achieve their shared goal 
only if they follow the same traffic conventions. However, there are multi-
ple and equally good alternative conventions – there is nothing morally or 
practically salient about driving either on the left or on the right – and thus 
mere commitment to the same goal by each traffic participant will not be 
sufficient achieve it. One convention has to be selected authoritatively and 
enforced against all. The need to establish coordination explains both the 
necessity of political authority for achieving justice and that one single au-
thority has to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a territory. This is so be-
cause if there are multiple (and independent)21 authorities, they may select 
and enforce different coordination points for the same coordination prob-
lems. The bottom line is the same. The state’s right to exclusive jurisdiction 
over a given territory is grounded in such exclusivity being a necessary con-
dition of establishing justice in that territory.
Territorial rights and the right to exclude
It is sometimes taken as self-evident that the territorial rights of states in-
clude the robust moral right to exclude admission-seekers on discretionary 
grounds. However, the right to exclude, if any, must be shown to be follow-
ing from the same considerations that ground the right of exclusive juris-
diction itself. The link between the two is not conceptual – it is possible to 
imagine states having the right of exclusive jurisdiction without possessing 
the right to exclude whoever they want. If there is a right to exclude, there 
must be a substantive argument that shows it to be linked with the same con-
siderations that justify territorial rights in general. In this section, the task is 
to explore whether the particular account of territorial rights that was out-
lined in the previous section provides any support for the right to exclude, 
and if so, how much.
The account outlined above was grounded in people’s dependence on secure 
access to the use of territory for provision of their human rights as well as 
the pursuit of their autonomous projects. The individual claim to territory 
is a universal one; it is true of every individual, regardless of where they live 
21 I add this qualifier to acknowledge the possibility of multiple authorities that are 
not strictly independent of each other in that they divide up the jurisdiction in function-
al terms, such that one may make rules in some domains and the other in different ones. 
Arguably, the European Union represents such a functional division of jurisdiction.
69
LIBERALISMS AND ANTI-LIBERALISMS – CHALLENGES AND ALTERNATIVES 
or of the institutional, cultural or associational ties that may exist between 
them, that they depend on access to territory for their human rights and au-
tonomy. Therefore, only such an international legal system can be morally 
justified from this perspective that secures this access to each person, uni-
versally. The putative right to exclude must be examined in this light.
It is not immediately self-evident that the right to exclude is incompatible 
with providing everyone secure access to territory. The individual claim to 
territory, as formulated above, does not make reference to access to any par-
ticular territory. Plausibly and with the exception of uninhabited and unin-
habitable places, just about any territory is capable of supporting people’s 
human rights and autonomous projects. In other words, their human rights 
and autonomy can be protected even if they do not have access to the specif-
ic destinations of their preference, as long as they have access to some places 
that offer protection of these interests. Therefore, it might be suggested that 
a world consisting only of internally just states (or at least states that pass a 
threshold of decency in terms of human rights fulfillment) with the right to 
exclude could satisfy everyone’s claim to territory, universally. To be sure, the 
right to exclude would not be unlimited. Specifically, under current circum-
stances, where a large number of states fall short of providing basic human 
rights and the conditions of autonomy for many of their citizens, the claim 
to territory of many persons can be guaranteed only if they are admitted to 
the territory of some state that does offer such protections. Therefore, the 
account of territorial rights outlined in this paper does not provide support 
for the exclusion of refugees subject to persecution in their source country 
or of destitute admission-seekers lacking the conditions of autonomy. Their 
claims count no less than the claims of current residents. This is, in and of 
itself, a significant result that crucially constrains the scope of the putative 
right to exclude under current and foreseeable conditions. 
However, I want to show that the basis of the right to exclude is dubious even 
assuming that every person’s relevant interests are protected by some min-
imally just state. In an important respect, whether there is a limited right to 
exclude under those highly idealized conditions depends on where the bur-
den of proof is in this matter. It has been argued above that the territorial 
rights of states are grounded in their being a necessary condition of estab-
lishing justice among persons over a given territory. The form of the argu-
ment suggests that territorial rights are justified only to the extent that they 
are necessary for protecting persons’ relevant rights. Now, it was suggested 
in the previous paragraph that under some special, highly favorable con-
ditions, satisfying individuals’ underlying claims is compatible with states’ 
right to exclude. But this putative right being compatible with the relevant 
rights of individuals does not in any way entail that it is necessary for the 
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state to discharge its basic protective function. And then, if it is not neces-
sary for that function, then it cannot be justified on this basis. The fact that 
the right to exclude is compatible (under some conditions) with the relevant 
individual rights is not sufficient for its justification. The burden of proof is 
on the proponents of the right to exclude that it is also necessary to protect 
the relevant individual rights. Nothing has been suggested so far that would 
support that much stronger claim.
At this point, the proponent of the right to exclude may choose one of two 
strategies. First, he may try to show that the right is indeed necessary in gen-
eral for the state to discharge its justice-related functions. This would en-
tail showing that states that lack the right to exclude cannot discharge their 
basic justice-related functions. Alternatively, he may try to shift the burden 
of proof back on his opponent by arguing that states can exercise whatever 
rights that are consistent with (even if not necessary for) their basic justice-re-
lated functions, and that it is the opponent of the right to exclude that must 
point to the wrongs that would be entailed by exercising the right to exclude. 
And, by hypothesis, the putative wrongs cannot be related to basic human 
rights and autonomy, since the latter were shown to be compatible (under 
the right circumstances) with the right to exclude. Therefore, the question 
boils down to where the burden of proof is: under the right circumstances, 
the right to exclude is assumed to be neither necessary for, nor incompati-
ble with, guaranteeing those rights of individuals that ultimately ground the 
territorial rights of states. If those individual rights do not, by themselves, 
decide the matter one way or another, then the question is this: which side 
holds the presumption in its favor that has to be defeated by the other side? 
To clarify, if one side has a right to do something and no fundamental inter-
ests of others are at stake, then the right is undefeated even if the right-holder 
does not have a fundamental interest in exercising that right, either. We are 
now assuming, for the sake of argument, that under favorable but conceiv-
able conditions there are no fundamental, justice-related interests at stake 
in states’ exercising exclusion. Exclusion is compatible with everyone hav-
ing their relevant rights protected, but at the same time lacking the power to 
exclude does not undermine states’ ability to discharge their justice-related 
functions. Then, whether exercising exclusion is morally defensible depends 
on whether states have a presumptive right to exclude or individuals have 
a presumptive right to be admitted to whatever territory of their choice. If 
viewed in this light, the case appears to tilt in favor of the presumptive right 
of individuals. States do not have interests of their own that are indepen-
dent of the interests of those over whom they exercise authority. By con-
trast, it is easy to see what interests individuals may have to be admitted to 
the territory of states of their choices. They may find countries different 
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from that of their current citizenship or legal residence more congenial for 
themselves for a number of different reasons: they may prefer their culture, 
climate, or professional opportunities to those of their own current home, 
they may have intimate relationships tied to those countries, and so on. Now, 
to be sure, admitting non-residents to the territory of a state does implicate 
the interests of its current residents. While it does not in general hold that 
immigrants are a drag on the economy or on the host country’s social ser-
vices, there may be all types of adjustment costs that are borne and some-
times painfully felt by specific individuals even if the host society is made 
better off (or not made worse off) on the whole. Moreover, the sudden influx 
of a very large number of admission-seekers may indeed disrupt the normal 
operation of particular state functions.22
This raises the problem of burden-sharing in two distinct ways. First, what 
counts as a fair distribution of burdens of immigration’s adjustment costs 
among states? And second, what counts as a fair distribution of adjustment 
costs among individuals within a particular state? The answers to these ques-
tions depend, of course on the content and scope of the principles of distrib-
utive justice that there are good reasons to accept. This is too large a topic 
to address here in any detail. However, a couple of points may be suggested 
tentatively. First, to the extent that are particular individuals or groups with-
in a society that experience special costs related to immigration, then the 
host society has a collective responsibility of justice to compensate them for 
those costs. Second, to the extent that particular societies face immigration 
on such a scale that places significant costs on them beyond the short term, 
the international community can be reasonable expected to either share the 
costs or to redirect some of the admission-seekers to other societies. After 
all, the interests of admission-seekers in being admitted are frequently not 
tied to unique destinations but to destinations with particular characteristics 
that are usually shared by some other states as well, and their claims to be 
admitted are not held against specific states but against all states that share 
those characteristics, collectively.
To sum up, considerations of costs beyond the short term, and of burden-shar-
ing, do not appear to support a robust right to exclude even in an idealized 
22 It is easy to exaggerate this point. I am not aware of a single example of a reasonably 
well-functioning, developed society whose public institutions experienced long-term, 
significant disruption as a direct result of immigration. Short-term shocks are another 
matter, but they are, after all, short-term. More often, disruption is not the direct result 
of immigration but of the public’s reaction to it. But then it may be suggested that the 
public’s attitudes ought to be sensitive to considerations of justice, rather than the other 
way around. The expected reactions of the public certainly constitute relevant consider-
ations for political decision-makers, but they are not directly relevant for the morality 
of the right to exclude.
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world where such a right would be consistent with protecting all the relevant 
rights of all individuals universally. Such considerations may justify compen-
sation and even limited temporary restrictions on admission, but nothing 
like the wholesale discretionary right to exclude that is routinely claimed by 
currently existing states.
Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that the territorial rights of states cannot be un-
derstood as being grounded either in the associational rights of their current 
citizens or in their property rights in land as transferred to the state. I sug-
gested that the Kantian conception of territorial rights as developed in re-
cent years by a number of theorists provides a more plausible basis. On this 
account, the territorial rights of states are ultimately grounded in individu-
als’ claim to territory as part of the necessary conditions of protecting their 
basic human rights and the conditions of their autonomy. However, I have 
argued that if the basis of territorial rights is to be found in this direction, 
then those rights do not include a broad right to exclude  admission-seekers. 
Even though the putative right to exclude may, under very favorable con-
ditions, be compatible with the individual rights that ground the territorial 
rights of states, it is not necessary for the state to discharge its basic justice-re-
lated functions. Therefore, to the extent that the content of territorial rights 
is specified with reference to the necessary conditions of fulfilling basic hu-
man rights and providing for the conditions of autonomy, the practice of 
excluding admission-seekers cannot be justified on that basis.
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Zoltan Mikloši
Udruživanje, svojina i teritorija: o čemu govorimo  
kada govorimo o imigraciji?
Apstrakt
Često se tvrdi da države imaju teritorijalna prava, odnosno da ta prava podrazu-
mevaju i pravo na isključivanje ljudi koji bi želeli da budu primljeni u teritorije 
pojedinih država. U ovom članku ćemo proučavati pitanje da li najviše odbranjiva 
teza o teritorijalnim pravima može da pruži podršku isključivanju. Analiziraću tri 
tipa teorije o teritorijalnim pravima. Prva teorija povezuje pravo država na isklju-
čivanje sa osnovnijem pravom pojedinica na udruživanje. Druga teorija je lokov-
ska teorija u kojoj se teritorijalna prava država, uključujući pravo na isključivanje, 
baziraju na osnovnijem pravu pojedinaca na privatnu svojinu na zemlji koja kon-
stituiše teritoriju države. Tvrdim da ove teorije imaju posledice koje nisu plauzi-
bilne, bez obzira na njihove implikacije u odnosu na rasprave o imigraciji. Treća 
teorija je kantijanska teorija koja se zasniva na teritorijalnoj jurisdikciji država, 
imajući u vidu obaveze pojedinaca u stvaranju i održavanju pravnog sistema koji 
je nužni uslov u garantovanju njihovih prava, odnosno u pogledu izvršavanja nji-
hovih obaveza. Moja teza je da je kantijanska teorija superiorna u odnosu na 
njene alternative, zatim da se pomoću nje ne može zasnivati šire pravo na 
isključivanje.
Ključne reči: pravo na isključivanje, sloboda udruživanja, svojina, teritorijalna 
prava
